Analysing necessity and sufficiency with Qualitative Comparative Analysis : how do results vary as case weights change? by Cooper,  B. & Glaesser,  J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
22 April 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cooper, B. and Glaesser, J. (2016) 'Analysing necessity and suﬃciency with Qualitative Comparative Analysis
: how do results vary as case weights change?', Quality and quantity., 50 (1). pp. 327-346.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0151-3
Publisher's copyright statement:
The ﬁnal publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0151-3.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Analysing necessity and sufficiency with Qualitative Comparative Analysis: 
how do results vary as case weights change? 
Barry Cooper & Judith Glaesser 
This is the pre-proofs version of the paper published in the journal Quality and Quantity 
(January 2015). The final publication is available at Springer via 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0151-3.   
Abstract 
Ragin's Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related set theoretic methods are 
increasingly popular. This is a welcome development, since it encourages systematic 
configurational analyses of social phenomena. One downside of this growth in popularity is a 
tendency for more researchers to use the approach in a formulaic manner - something made 
possible, and more likely, by the availability of free software. We wish to see QCA 
employed, as Ragin intended, in a self-critical manner. For this to happen, researchers need to 
understand more of what is going on behind the results generated by the available software 
packages. One important aspect of set theoretic analyses of sufficiency and necessity is the 
effect that the distribution of cases in a dataset can have on results. We explore this issue in a 
number of ways. We begin by exploring how both deterministic and nondeterministic data-
generating processes are reflected in the analyses of populations differing in only the weights 
of types of cases. We show how and why weights matter in causal analyses that focus on 
necessity and also, where models are not fully specified, sufficiency. We then draw on this 
discussion to show that a recent textbook discussion of hidden necessary conditions is 
weakened as a result of its neglect of weighting issues. Finally, having shown that case 
weights raise a number of difficulties for set theoretic analyses, we offer suggestions, 
drawing on two imagined population datasets concerning health outcomes, for mitigating 
their effect. 
 
Introduction 
Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) provides a way of undertaking case-based 
configurational analysis, focusing on the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome. 
QCA is increasingly used to undertake systematic set-theoretic analyses of small to medium 
datasets and, occasionally, to analyse large survey datasets. While regression approaches 
typically aim to estimate the net effects of variables on an outcome, while controlling for 
other variables, QCA typically focuses on the consequences of conjunctions of conditions 
(Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). Whether QCA is a method for establishing causal or descriptive 
knowledge is currently a matter of debate. Baumgartner (2014), who has developed the 
related Boolean technique of Coincidence Analysis (CNA), argues that the Boolean analysis 
of regularities is the correct route to the establishment of causes as difference-makers. Others 
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see QCA as a more descriptive approach. We have argued elsewhere (Cooper and Glaesser 
2012) that QCA is best used with some additional method such as process-tracing when 
causal understanding is sought. Gerring (2012, pages 356-358) makes similar points, 
discussing what Ragin and others have written on this topic.  
An important question to ask of any method is how it functions when confronted with a 
thought experiment in which we postulate some assumed causal structure which should, 
ceteris paribus, generate a particular set of regular relationships between explanatory 
conditions and some outcome. Assuming a particular causal relation, and an associated data 
generating process, we would want the results delivered by any analytic method to reflect 
these, at least in those cases where we correctly enter all the conditions into our analysis. In 
practice, of course, social scientists often analyse data via less than perfectly specified 
models, and it is therefore also important to explore, as we will for the case of QCA, how a 
method copes, given a postulated assumed causal structure, when some explanatory 
conditions are omitted from the analytic model and/or some redundant ones are included.  
We write then on the assumption that simulations using simple examples are often useful for 
assessing the extent to which methods can deliver findings that reflect validly some assumed 
underlying causal structure (Baumgartner, 2014). They can also serve a useful purpose in 
increasing scholars’ understanding of the potential pitfalls associated with any analytic 
algorithm, especially those that arise when, as is typical, we have less than perfect knowledge 
of the factors causally relevant to an outcome.  
Our particular concern in this paper is whether and how weighting, i.e., the distribution of 
types of cases with certain characteristics in the sample and/or the population under study, 
affects analytic results when QCA is employed. The importance of this issue has become 
clear to us while undertaking QCAs of various datasets (Cooper, 2005; Glaesser and Cooper, 
2012) and when reflecting on arguments made in Schneider and Wagemann (2012) 
concerning the sources of “hidden necessary conditions” in Boolean analyses. We will 
discuss case weights in the context of crisp set QCA. We will not address fuzzy set QCA but 
the reader familiar with QCA will be able to see that parallel issues arise when fuzzy sets are 
employed. The arguments we make are of general relevance, and not specific to small, 
medium or large n QCA.  There will be some specific situations, however, where the use, in 
minimising a truth table, of a frequency threshold would affect the ways in which weights 
affect an analysis.  
To follow our arguments, any reader new to QCA will need a brief introduction to the indices 
used in crisp set QCA. The paper has the following structure: 
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 Section 1 introduces essential elements of crisp set QCA.  
 Section 2 explores the problems that the relative proportions of cases can produce for 
QCA users with varying degrees of knowledge of the full set of causes of some 
outcome who research, in terms of quasi-sufficiency and quasi-necessity, a simple 
deterministic structure.  
 Section 3 considers a non-deterministic structure. 
 Section 4 discusses related problems in Schneider and Wagemann’s treatment of 
necessary conditions. 
 Section 5, in the light of the problems pointed to in the earlier sections, considers 
possible ways QCA users might mitigate their consequences. 
1. QCA (crisp set): bare bones of measures 
For strict sufficiency of a condition, or a conjunction of conditions, X for Y, we need, 
wherever X is present, to find Y also present.  This requires the subset of cases with the 
conditions X to be a subset of the cases with the outcome Y (the left-hand side of Fig. 1). For 
strict necessity of a condition Z for Y, on the other hand, we need, given the outcome Y, 
always to find the condition Z present. This requires the set of cases with the outcome Y to be 
a subset of the set of cases with the condition Z (the left-hand side of Fig. 2). In practice, 
subset relations in the social world are frequently not as perfect as these. The more realistic 
right-hand sides of the two figures show such approximations to sufficiency (Fig. 1) and 
necessity (Fig. 2). Ragin (2008) uses, for crisp sets, a simple measure of the closeness of such 
relations to strict subsethood. Consider sufficiency. On the right-hand side of Fig. 1, he takes 
the proportion of cases in X that fall within the boundaries of Y as a measure of the 
consistency of these data with sufficiency. Such imperfect subset relations are usually 
described with the terms quasi-sufficient (and, for necessity, quasi-necessary). In the case of 
Fig. 1, the right-hand side would give us a consistency of the order of 0.8, usually taken as 
large enough to support a claim of quasi-sufficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Strict and quasi-sufficiency of X for Y Fig. 2 Strict and quasi-necessity of Z for Y 
 
Alongside these measures of consistency, Ragin (2006, 2008) defines associated measures of 
coverage. These assess the empirical importance of a condition. In the case of sufficiency, 
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coverage assesses the extent to which a condition X “covers” the outcome set, i.e. how many 
cases of the outcome are “explained” by the condition. It is mathematically equivalent to the 
measure of the consistency with necessity of X for Y, i.e. how much of Y is also X. In Fig. 1 
the coverage of X is low (and, correspondingly, X is not necessary or quasi-necessary for Y). 
For a necessary condition Z, coverage assesses the extent to which it is also sufficient for the 
outcome. Z’s coverage is mathematically equivalent to the consistency with sufficiency of Z. 
In Fig. 2, the coverage of the necessary condition Z is low (and, correspondingly, Z is not 
sufficient or quasi-sufficient for Y).  
Finally, it is important to note that it is usually configurations, or conjunctions of causes, that 
are the focus of analysis in QCA. These are represented by such expressions as (P*Q*~R) + 
(M*N) where the * indicates set intersection (logical AND), the ~ negates a set (“not R” in 
our example), and + indicates set union (logical OR). A conjunction such as P*Q*~R is 
allowed into the final solution if, say, at least 80% of the cases in the set P*Q*~R achieve the 
outcome under study. If it is also true that the configuration P*Q*R meets this 80% threshold 
for quasi-sufficiency, then the terms P*Q*~R and P*Q*R can be minimised to P*Q on the 
grounds that the absence or presence of R, given the chosen threshold, makes no relevant 
difference to the proportion of cases achieving the outcome.  
2. A simple deterministic structure 
We will explore the problems that may arise as a result of inadequate reflection on the 
analytic effects of case weights for those wishing to undertake causal analysis via QCA or 
similar techniques. We will initially work outwards from a postulated causal structure, 
showing how the distribution of cases in a dataset, given this structure, impacts on measures 
of consistency with sufficiency and necessity. It is important to hold in mind that we are 
assuming that this structure exists in the world but that the social scientist undertaking the 
analysis of its effects may have a far from perfect knowledge of it.  
The first postulated structure links two factors, a condition T and an outcome O. Whenever T 
is present, and only when T is present, does O occur. We will also assume, however, that our 
imagined researchers may variously believe that T is the crucial cause of O, or that a factor S 
is the sole cause of the outcome, or that S and T together are important. For this reason, we 
set out four empirical relationships between the presence and absence of S, T and O that are 
compatible with the structure
1
. A plausible substantive interpretation of 1-4 might be that T 
                                              
1
 We are assuming, to keep things simpler, that the causal relations between S, T and O are not a function of the 
distributions of the possible configurations of the two conditions S and T and their negations in the populations. 
In fact, they often will be: in cases, for example, where the configurations are real actors in conflict over 
positional goods. We are also bracketing out here any causal analysis of the origin of the pattern of weights in a 
truth table. Clearly there are causes behind the weight of cases in a population. Wars would affect, via 
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represents having high cognitive ability and S membership of the dominant ethnic group in a 
society where there are just two ethnic groups, while O is some career outcome.  
S*T => O      (Implication 1) 
S*~T => ~O      (Implication 2) 
~S*T => O      (Implication 3) 
~S*~T => ~O      (Implication 4) 
Now, a researcher using QCA who correctly believes that T is the cause of O will find, on 
collecting data of adequate quality, that T is both sufficient and necessary for O, i.e. T <=> O. 
We now, however, explore the case of a researcher who believes that both T and S matter for 
the outcome. Such a researcher will collect data on S, T and O in order to construct a truth 
table to explore the evidence for implications 1-4. Such a truth table will have the form 
shown in Table 1 where A, B, C and D stand for the number of cases in the four 
configurations.  
Table 1: Truth table representing implications 1-4. 
Implication S T Configuration Number of cases O: Consistency with sufficiency 
1 1 1 ST A 1 
2 1 0 S~T B 0 
3 0 1 ~ST C 1 
4 0 0 ~S~T D 0 
 
Ignoring for the moment the numbers of cases in the rows, we could describe this table by ST 
+ ~ST <=> O
2
 (writing S*T as ST for convenience), or, after minimising the left-hand side, T 
<=> O. T is both sufficient and necessary for O, as we want. What happens if we begin to 
vary the number of cases per row?  Table 2 shows two possible distributions of A-D. 
Table 2: Two sets of values for A-D 
Configuration Outcome O Number of cases In dataset 1 In dataset 2 
ST Present A  16 48 
S~T Absent  B 4 4 
~ST Present C 17 5 
~S~T Absent D 5 5 
 
                                                                                                                                            
migration, the weights of ethnic groups, for example. Birth rates – and their causes – the weights of children in 
social classes. Random processes will affect weights in samples from populations. These matters are clearly also 
important, but not our concern here. 
2
 This non-minimised relation also reminds us that, as Baumgartner (2008) notes, as long as there are at least 
two terms on the left-hand side, there is an asymmetry between sufficiency and necessity. It makes sense to 
think of causal influences running from left to right, but not from right to left, since knowing O does not tell us 
which of the two left-hand side terms are present. 
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Whatever the values of A-D
3
, ST and ~ST will always be found to be sufficient for O. T will 
always be found to be necessary for O. The solution will remain T <=> O. But now consider 
a researcher who believes that only S matters and therefore collects no data on T. The truth 
table will reduce to just two rows, one for S (with A+B cases) and one for ~S (with C+D 
cases). The consistency with sufficiency of S is given by A / (A+B). For dataset 1 it is 0.8, 
and for dataset 2 it is 0.923. The consistency of S with necessity is given by A / (A+C). For 
dataset 1 it is 0.485; for dataset 2 0.906.  
In the case of dataset 2 the result suggests that S is both quasi-sufficient and quasi-necessary 
for O. For dataset 1, on the other hand, there is good support for quasi-sufficiency but none 
for quasi-necessity. Remember the causal structure is fixed. Only the weights of cases have 
changed. Given that in much empirical research there is incomplete knowledge of the causal 
factors producing an outcome, this dependency of the solution on the weights of cases is 
clearly an important issue for users of QCA and related techniques. In this case, for dataset 2, 
the pattern of case weights has misled the analyst who believed S was the crucial cause.  
Now, since we know, by our design of the thought experiment, the generative causal basis 
underlying 1-4, we know that S is not necessary, since implication 3, compatible with T <=> 
O, says ~ST => O. A problem exists concerning the assessment of the necessity of S for the 
researcher who believes S is the cause of O. Note that we can imagine population proportions 
which raise the consistency of S with necessity much higher. If we give C in dataset 2 the 
value of 1, then we have a consistency of 48 / (48+1), i.e. 0.980. It is worth looking at the 
range of possible values for the consistency with necessity of S in our example (where T <=> 
O). If we fix A at 100 and let C vary in relation to it (from 1 to 100 for illustration)
4
 then it is 
easy to see that the consistency varies from a little over 0.99 to exactly 0.50. This is shown in 
Fig. 3.  
                                              
3
 As long as they each are above zero and we have adequate evidence for the implication claims 1-4. 
4
 The crucial issue here is the ratio of A to C, not the absolute sizes of A or C. 
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Fig. 3 Quasi-necessity of S as the ratio of A to C varies. 
 
It is often argued that the necessity (or sufficiency coverage) of a factor should only be 
assessed where the factor has first been shown to be sufficient (Ragin 2008). However, given 
less than perfect knowledge of the causal factors operating on an outcome, the distribution of 
cases, as we have seen, also affects consistency with sufficiency. Again, consider the 
researcher who believes S is the crucial cause.  Returning to datasets 1 and 2, we can see that 
the consistency with sufficiency of S is given by A / (A+B). In dataset 1 it is 16 / (16+4), or 
0.800. In dataset 2, it is 48 / (48+4), or 0.923. If we change the value of A to 2 in dataset 2, 
this consistency becomes 2 / (2+4), or just 0.333. If we fix A at 100 and, illustratively, let B 
vary from 1 to 100, then the consistency of S with sufficiency varies from 0.99 to 0.5, as did 
its consistency with necessity with varying C. Now, in this simple deterministic world, both 
B and C can be varied independently of A and of each other without affecting implications 1-
4. We assume our generative causal structure remains intact under these changes. We can for 
example, having fixed A at 100, and leaving the irrelevant D at 5, reverse the values of B and 
C in two new datasets 3 and 4 (Table 3). When we do this we switch the consistencies of S 
with sufficiency and necessity, as Table 3 records: 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Q-N(S) 
Value of C 
Quasi-necessity of S = A/(A+C): A fixed at 100 
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Table 3: Two more datasets 
Configuration Percent with Outcome Numbers of cases Dataset 3 Dataset 4 
ST 100 A 100 100 
S~T 0 B 1 100 
~ST 100 C 100 1 
~S~T 0 D 5 5 
  Consistency (necessity) of S 0.50 0.99 
  Consistency (sufficiency) of S 0.99 0.50 
 
We have shown that, given a fixed causal structure, and a researcher with incomplete 
knowledge of which causes matter, a wide range of results for consistencies are possible, 
simply as a result of changes in the weights of types of cases in the dataset. This suggests 
that, for any researcher thinking causally rather than descriptively, QCA analyses that ignore 
the effects of case weights on consistency formulas may be problematic. To this point we 
have considered a deterministic structure but allowed its analysis in terms of quasi-
sufficiency and quasi-necessity. In the next section we will assume that the causal structure is 
not fully deterministic.  
3. A non-deterministic causal scenario 
We continue by considering a simple non-deterministic structure in which there are two 
causal factors, S and T, and an outcome O. The assumption is again that there is a particular 
structure in the world, but that the researcher has imperfect knowledge of its features. The 
postulated structure is such that, for the four possible configurations of S and T and their 
negations, all else being equal, the proportions gaining the outcome O are those shown in 
Table 4
5
. Here, differently from the earlier structure, we are assuming that both S and T are 
causes of O. We will also assume, however, that a researcher might suspect that S alone, or T 
alone, or both S and T may be causes of O. 
Table 4: Consistencies with sufficiency for 4 configurations 
S T Configuration Proportion gaining the outcome (O) 
1 1 ST 0.99 
1 0 S~T 0.65 
0 1 ~ST 0.2 
0 0 ~S~T 0.1 
                                              
5
 This fictitious structure, for our current purposes, is best seen as incorporating a random element (as in, e.g., 
ST causes the probability of gaining the outcome to be 0.99). It would also be possible to see it as having 
omitted some relevant causal factor but, given the ways in which imperfect model specification can also affect 
the assessment of sufficiency (see section 2 and what follows in this section), this possible account of it is best 
avoided in this paper.   
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Table 5: Three invented populations 
S T A: numbers B: numbers C: numbers 
1 1 100 200 200 
1 0 100 20 1800 
0 1 100 100 100 
0 0 100 100 100 
 
Table 6: Consistencies above 0.8 with sufficiency and necessity (coverage in brackets) 
Set Population A: 
consistency 
with 
sufficiency  
Population A: 
consistency 
with necessity 
Population B: 
consistency 
with 
sufficiency  
Population B: 
consistency 
with necessity  
Population C: 
consistency 
with 
sufficiency  
Population C: 
consistency 
with necessity  
~T      0.844  (0.621) 
T    0.905  (0.727)   
~S       
S 0.820 (0.845) 0.845 (0.82) 0.959 (0.876)  0.876  (0.959)  0.979  (0.684) 
~ST       
S~T      0.837  (0.65) 
ST 0.990 (0.510)  0.990 (0.822) 0.822  (0.99) 0.990 (0.142)  
~S~T       
 
For the sake of our illustration of the ways weights may affect various researchers’ findings 
we will consider three possible datasets, shown in Table 5
6
. Table 6 sets out all indices of 
consistency with sufficiency and necessity that pass a threshold of 0.8, adding the coverage 
figures in brackets. For completeness, given that any researcher may or may not know 
correctly what the true causes of O are, we have included in the table all of S, T, their 
negations and conjunctions of these.  
First, we can see from Table 6 that, considering quasi-sufficiency, the results from all three 
populations tell us that ST is quasi-sufficient for O at a very high level (0.99). Any researcher 
correctly believing that S and T are both causes here would have found this result to be 
unaffected by the different weighting of cases in the three datasets. The researcher believing 
just S to be the cause of O would have found S to be sufficient, using a threshold of 0.8, in 
datasets A and B but not C. If s/he had happened to use a stricter threshold of 0.9, then S 
would have been found to be sufficient in just dataset B. Weighting matters, unless we 
assume a researcher with full knowledge of the causes operating.  
Measures of necessity are also affected by the case weights, of course. For a researcher who 
enters both S and T in their QCA model, and finds the solution for sufficiency of ST => O, 
the consistency with necessity of ST will vary across the three datasets from 0.510 in dataset 
A, through 0.822 in B, to 0.142 in C. Separate assessments of the necessity of the two factors 
                                              
6
 Again, we are assuming, to keep things simpler, that the causal relations between S, T and O are not a function 
of the distributions of the configurations in the populations. (See footnote 1.) 
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are also weights-dependent. T only passes the 0.8 threshold in dataset B. S passes it in all 
three datasets to differing degrees
7
.  
How important are these effects of weights? The answer partly hinges on the position one 
takes on the purpose of QCA and related techniques. Baumgartner (2014) argues that the 
purpose of Boolean techniques is to gain causal knowledge via the analysis of regularities, 
and that this requires, ideally, a solution of the form C1 + C2 + C3 <=> O, where the 
disjunction of conjuncts on the left-hand side is both sufficient and necessary for the outcome 
O. On this argument, if ST <=> O appears as the solution, with ST both sufficient and 
necessary for O, then this lends support to a causal claim. Using our threshold of 0.8, and 
when the researcher correctly believes both S and T matter, this solution would appear for 
population B, but not for A or C. The key point is perhaps that any causal conclusions based 
merely on an analysis of the regularities deriving from our postulated causal structure will 
vary with the weights characterising our dataset. If the researcher is assumed to know that S 
and T matter, the key problem in this particular scenario concerns the ways the assessment of 
necessity vary with case weights. Any researcher deciding on the necessity of a causal 
condition, or a combination of conditions, purely on the basis of the consistency with 
necessity taken from a particular population would seem to be effectively assuming that the 
distribution of cases in this particular population is, in some sense, privileged
8
. 
There is another view of this issue. Someone arguing that the sufficiency of ST is the crucial 
matter to uncover might argue that the varying assessments of nearness to necessity – in their 
guise of coverage – merely give us useful descriptive information about the empirical 
importance of this pathway in the three datasets. Ragin has argued this position, arguing that 
the best uses of the truth table analysis in QCA are “more descriptive”, providing “a basis for 
causal interpretation at the individual case level”9. Here the analysis of sufficiency is 
prioritised and any subsequent assessment of the necessity of individual factors appearing in 
solutions should depend not only on the numerical index of consistency with necessity but 
should also entail “a good measure of corroborating substantive evidence and theoretical 
argumentation”10.   
                                              
7
 It is perhaps important to note that our arguments do not depend on the particular threshold (0.8) employed. 
Given appropriate case weights and/or postulated causal structures, the problems we discuss could also appear 
with stricter thresholds such as 0.9. 
8
 We will not discuss samples from populations in this paper, but clearly much of what we write has 
implications for the use of QCA with samples, especially where some cases are more or less represented than 
others via sampling (see Glaesser and Cooper 2012). We should also note, concerning populations, that 
sometimes there will be only one population. Some implications of this for the analysis of necessity are 
considered in Section 5. 
9
 Personal communication (email), 10/11/14. 
10
 Personal communication (email), 10/11/14. 
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Considering in this section a non-deterministic causal structure, we have shown again that the 
case weights matter. In the case of necessity, even when we assumed, initially, that we knew 
that S and T are the important causal factors, and that we knew the causal consequences for 
the outcome of their various conjunctions, we found the assessment of necessity of some 
conditions and configurations varying across our three populations. We want now to show 
how these weighting problems considered so far are reflected in a recent discussion by 
Schneider and Wagemann of "hidden necessary conditions". We have previously pointed out 
some problems with their textbook discussion of “hidden necessary conditions” (Cooper et al. 
2014). We will revisit these, but then develop a more general perspective on one of the issues 
they raise, drawing on our discussion earlier in this paper. 
 
4. Schneider & Wagemann on "hidden necessary conditions" and inconsistent truth 
table rows 
 
So far, in thought experiments, we have considered the problems weights might cause given 
two causal structures, one deterministic, one not. We will now discuss an example from a 
prominent textbook on set theoretic methods (Schneider and Wagemann 2012) where the 
generative causal structure is, as is often the case in empirical science, unknown to the 
analyst. The focus in this section is on assessing quasi-necessity.  
Having previously discussed “hidden necessary conditions” due to incoherent counterfactuals 
in the context of limited diversity
11
 Schneider and Wagemann (2012) begin their second 
section on “hidden necessary conditions” by arguing that such incoherent assumptions about 
remainders are not the only reason for the disappearance of necessary conditions. They note 
that necessary conditions can disappear even from a conservative solution term (their 
preferred term for what Ragin terms a complex solution). This can arise, they say, when 
“inconsistent truth table rows are included in the logical minimisation that contain the 
absence of the necessary condition” (225). By “inconsistent” rows, they refer to rows 
containing cases where some achieve the outcome and some do not. They illustrate this 
possibility with the hypothetical example reproduced here as Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
11
 Cooper et al. (2014) also provide a critical discussion of Schneider and Wagemann’s arguments and proposals 
re the treatment of necessary conditions given limited diversity. 
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Table 7: Schneider and Wagemann’s (2012) Table 9.2 
 Conditions Outcome  
Row A B C Y Cases with Y Cases with ~Y Consistency for Y 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 1 1 20 0 1 
3 0 1 0 0 0 39 0 
4 0 1 1 0 0 15 0 
5 1 0 0 1 10 0 1 
6 1 0 1 1 15 0 1 
7 1 1 0 1 4 1 0.8 
8 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 
 
Schneider and Wagemann’s argument proceeds as follows. Looking at row 7 of Table 7, it 
can be seen that, of these five cases that are AB~C, four have the outcome Y. This 
configuration is therefore quasi-sufficient for Y, with a consistency of 0.8. If we run a QCA 
on the truth table in Table 7 that allows row 7 to go forward (i.e. accepting a consistency of 
0.8 as adequate for quasi-sufficiency) we obtain the following minimised solution: 
A~C  +  ~BC  => Y     (Equation 1) 
The first term, A~C, has a consistency with sufficiency of 0.93 and the second, ~BC, of 1.0. 
As Schneider and Wagemann note, no single condition appears in both paths and one might 
be “tempted to conclude there is no necessary condition for Y” (226). They note, however, 
that separate tests for necessary conditions show ~B to be necessary for Y, with a very high 
consistency of 0.92
12. They argue that, “based on the empirical evidence, we have good 
reasons to consider ~B to be a relevant necessary condition for Y”. They argue (p. 226) that 
~B disappears because it is “minimized from the sufficiency solution by matching row 5 of 
Table 9.2 (A~B~C) with the inconsistent row 7 (AB~C) into the sufficient path A~C. ... thus, 
the necessary condition disappears from the sufficiency solution because both the former and 
the latter are not fully consistent.”  
Our earlier discussion of the effects of the relative numbers of cases suggests this is far from 
the whole story. To see why, consider a small change in the truth table, one that removes the 
problem of inconsistency. Assume, contrary to what we see in Table 7, that all five cases in 
row 7 achieve the outcome Y. What then happens when we undertake a QCA that parallels 
that reported by Schneider and Wagemann? On the basis of changing just one case from not 
having to having the outcome, we obtain the same algebraic solution as in Equation 1 (though 
in this case both terms are strictly sufficient, i.e. have consistencies of one). And, once again, 
~B is quasi-necessary for Y (with a consistency of 0.90 rather than 0.92). We have no 
inconsistent rows, but we still have the “problem”. Clearly, ~B, when it is a quasi-necessary 
condition, can disappear from the solution even in the absence of the inconsistency in row 7. 
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 45 of the 49 cases with the outcome Y have the condition ~B. 
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The problem of this hidden necessary condition is not then due to the inconsistency of row 7 
per se. What then is its cause? Our earlier discussion suggests that the relative number of 
cases per row may be a crucial factor: analysing deterministic datasets 1 and 2, we found that 
a researcher focusing attention on the single condition S would find the condition S quasi-
necessary for dataset 2, but not for dataset 1, simply as a result of the differing distributions 
of case numbers in the configurations. A glance at Schneider and Wagemann’s truth table 
shows there are quite different numbers of cases in its various rows. It is therefore instructive 
to undertake another analysis. If we increase the number of cases in row seven to 40, but 
retain the proportion in this row achieving the outcome at 0.8, we obtain the same solution for 
sufficiency (with the first term having a consistency of 0.84 and the second of 1), but we now 
find that a test for the necessity of ~B returns a consistency of only 0.58. ~B is no longer a 
quasi-necessary condition.  The “problem” of its being a hidden necessary condition 
disappears. The inconsistency of row 7 is not the fundamental problem. Even given this 
inconsistency, we can remove the problem of the disappearance of ~B by reweighting so that 
it is no longer a necessary condition in the first place. This is what we found earlier when we 
kept the proportion of cases within the configurations obtaining the outcome the same in 
populations A, B and C (see Section 3), but varied the case numbers. Our varying of the 
numbers had a marked effect on whether or not certain conditions or configurations of 
conditions passed the threshold for quasi-necessity. 
The fundamental problem is not due to inconsistencies per se (though these will certainly 
modify the way it appears) but to the weight of cases in the rows of truth tables, coupled with 
the manner in which the arithmetic of proportions works. Indeed we can make the problem 
much worse by running the analysis with just one case in row 7 – a case which has the 
outcome – and therefore with no inconsistency characterising this row. Doing this, we obtain 
the solution for sufficiency in Equation 1 (with both terms having consistencies of 1) while 
the consistency with necessity of ~B rises to an almost perfect 0.98, higher than the 0.92 that 
provided the basis for  Schneider and Wagemann’s arguments.  
Clearly, Schneider and Wagemann, in choosing their example, have brought an important 
issue to our attention. In our view, however, in concentrating on just the inconsistency, they 
have not treated it in a general enough fashion. We also need to consider weights. To explore 
the consequences of weighting for their example, we will now consider how several 
consistency and coverage measures vary as we change the weighting of the rows in their 
table. We will present two graphs that illustrate the general patterns we find as we vary the 
number of cases in row 7 while holding the other case numbers constant. The first graph (Fig. 
4) maintains Schneider and Wagemann's consistency of 0.8 for row 7. In the second (Fig. 5) 
14 
 
we move away from their focus on inconsistency and raise the consistency of row 7 to a 
perfect 1.0.  
Fig. 4 shows how the consistency with necessity of ~B falls away as we increase the number 
of cases in row 7. Schneider and Wagemann choose to have 5 cases in this row - a small 
number in relation to the rows including ~B that achieved the outcome (respectively 20, 10 
and 15). It is important to note that, given the particular distribution of cases in the other 
rows, the consistency with necessity of ~B falls away much more quickly than does that of 
the consistency of the solution for sufficiency itself. Once we have 25 cases in row 7 we find 
that the consistency with necessity of ~B is below 0.7 and the original problem of ~B being a 
(hidden) necessary condition begins to disappear.  
 
Fig. 4 Solution is A~C+~BC: Effect of changing the number of cases in AB~C (in which 
80% achieve the outcome) 
 
Fig. 5, where the AB~C row now has 100% consistency with sufficiency rather than 80%, 
shows a perhaps more striking pattern than Fig. 4. Here, looking at the situation where there 
are just 5 cases in row 7 (i.e. reproducing Schneider and Wagemann’s case numbers), we 
have a consistency with necessity of ~B of 0.90 - very close to that of 0.92 in Schneider and 
Wagemann’s original "inconsistent row" example. If we drop the cases in row 7 to 4 then, 
even without any inconsistency, we are back to their result: a consistency with necessity of 
~B of 0.92 while ~B still does not appear in all the terms in the solution for sufficiency. The 
overall solution, A~C+~BC, maintains a perfect consistency of 1.0 here as the number of 
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cases in row 7 is varied. There is a sense in which the inconsistent case introduced by 
Schneider and Wagemann to make their argument concerning a hidden necessary condition is 
actually irrelevant. If we delete just this case from the dataset, the row AB~C (now with a 
consistency of exactly 1) goes forward into the solution A~C+~BC, and the consistency with 
necessity of ~B remains at 0.92
13
. Perhaps the most important general point to emphasise 
about Fig. 5 is that, given perfect sufficiency for all of the rows of Table 7, the necessity 
index for ~B changes as we vary the weight of cases in AB~C. The coverage indices for the 
two minimised terms in the solution also vary (but always add to 1). It makes sense to see 
coverage here as indicating the relative empirical importance of the two pathways A~C and 
~BC as the weights change.  
 
Fig. 5 Solution is A~C+~BC: Effect of changing the number of cases in AB~C (with 100% 
achieving the outcome) 
 
We have shown by first considering hypothetical examples in sections 2 and 3 and then 
discussing Schneider and Wagemann’s  (2012) example that analytic work using QCA must 
pay more attention to the weights of cases in the rows of truth tables than has been, to now, 
usual. This is particularly important in the case of causally oriented analyses of necessity but, 
in addition, when we cannot be sure we have a full and correctly specified model of the 
causal structure we are exploring, the relative weights may also, as we have shown earlier, 
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adversely affect analyses of sufficiency. Schneider and Wagemann (2012), addressing 
situations where the analysis of necessary conditions can go awry, have argued that the 
inconsistency in a row of a truth table is a crucial factor. We have argued, by generalising 
their example, that the crucial factor is actually not this inconsistency but the case weights 
characterising a truth table. Their problem of a hidden quasi-necessary condition both can 
arise in the absence of any such inconsistency and also fail to appear in the face of one.  
Schneider and Wagemann, arguing that this problem is due to the inconsistent row, propose 
the “imperfect remedy” of increasing thresholds for consistency. They point out that had a 
stricter threshold for sufficiency of 1.0 been used to analyse Table 7, then the inconsistent 
row AB~C would not have been allowed into the minimisation process and the “necessary 
condition ~B would not thus have been logically minimised away”. However, as they note, 
were the same threshold used for testing necessity, ~B would no longer be a necessary 
condition. We have shown that this problem is a more difficult one than they suggest, having 
its roots not so much in inconsistent rows as in the distribution of cases across rows (even 
where there are no inconsistencies at all). For this reason, even in truth tables with no 
inconsistent rows, the problem needs to be at the forefront of a QCA-user's mind. We 
therefore need more discussion of how to deal with this problem.   
5. What to do about this problem? 
 
We have considered the difficulties that can arise if the issue of case weights is not taken 
seriously. In the rest of the paper we will discuss what we might do to alleviate the 
problematic effects of varying weights across populations. We will focus, given the space 
available, on necessity, and consider it in the simplest context of having full knowledge of the 
causal structure
14
. We start by considering the usefulness here of measures of empirical 
importance such as coverage and relevance. We then develop an alternative approach that we 
first suggested in Cooper et al. (2014). 
 
5.1 Measures of trivialness and relevance: a way forward? 
Can the work that has been done on measures of coverage, triviality and relevance (Goertz 
2006, Ragin 2006, Schneider and Wagemann 2012) offer us a way to address the issues 
raised earlier? To explore this question, we will employ a thought experiment involving two 
populations sharing the same causal structure. Consider Table 8. This, we will assume for the 
moment, is the full data from a small population on the relation between nourishment in 
pregnancy and the health of babies. We will also assume that there is an underlying causal 
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causes. 
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relation between maternal nourishment and a baby’s health. In this population the majority of 
mothers (69.94%) are adequately nourished (our X). Most babies (71.68%) are healthy (our 
Y).  
Table 8: Society D 
 Unhealthy baby (~Y) Healthy baby (Y) Totals 
Adequately 
nourished mother (X) 
25 3000 3025 
Not adequately 
nourished mother 
(~X) 
1200 100 1300 
Totals 1225 3100 4325 
 
Having an adequately nourished mother is close to being perfectly sufficient for the 
subsequent health of the baby. In addition, when the mother is not adequately nourished, over 
90% of babies are unhealthy. Maternal nourishment clearly matters. It is also clear that 
having an adequately nourished mother is a quasi-necessary condition for being a healthy 
baby (consistency of 0.968, coverage of 0.992). Adequate nourishment is both quasi-
necessary and quasi-sufficient for a healthy baby. Now we consider how some of the 
measures of the trivialness and/or relevance of a necessary condition behave with these data.  
Goertz (2006) argues that a necessary condition becomes more relevant as it becomes more 
sufficient. Adequate nourishment passes this test, and, correspondingly, Ragin’s (2006) 
coverage measure is high. Goertz also argues that the number of cases in the ~X,~Y cell 
allows us to assess the trivialness of a necessary condition. Zero cases in this cell indicate 
trivialness. We have 1200 cases here, far from zero. This is certainly large enough for us to 
be able to check, for example, that ~X tends to imply ~Y which we want to see when X tends 
to being necessary for Y.  
Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 233-237) argue that X and Y being nearly constants is 
another basis for a necessary condition being trivial. They offer a formula for assessing 
trivialness and relevance (on a single scale) that addresses this problem, claiming (page 237) 
that this parameter: “… can be deemed a valid assessment of the relevance of a necessary 
condition. Low values indicate trivialness and high values relevance.”15 Applying the 
“Schneider-Wagemann formula16 for relevance”, where low scores on a 0-1 scale indicate 
trivialness, and high scores relevance, then we obtain for the necessary condition “adequate 
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differentiates their approach from that of Goertz. For him, relevance parallels Ragin’s coverage, i.e. the degree 
to which a necessary condition is also sufficient. See footnote 12 on page 237 of their book. 
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 This is SUM(1-Xi) / SUM(1-MIN(Xi,Yi). The key point here is that cases in the X,Y cell of a 2x2 table 
contribute nothing to the summation. Schneider and Wagemann (2012) argue that their formula picks up a 
source of trivialness missed by Ragin’s coverage measure. 
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nourishment” a score of 0.981. Adequate nourishment is, on their measure, a relevant 
necessary condition. All seems well so far, with the various parameters lining up. 
But now consider our focus - weighting. Consider Table 9, taken from a second society, 
where just the weight of cases in the ~X row happens to be different. The consistency with 
quasi-sufficiency of X and ~X for Y are unchanged. Consider the rows. Having an adequately 
nourished mother is again close to being perfectly sufficient for the subsequent health of the 
baby. Again, when the mother is not adequately nourished, over 90% of babies are unhealthy. 
Having an adequately nourished mother is a necessary condition for being a healthy baby 
(consistency of almost 1, coverage of 0.992). Again, adequate nourishment is quasi-necessary 
and quasi-sufficient for a healthy baby. 
Table 9: Society E 
 Unhealthy baby (~Y) Healthy baby (Y) Totals 
Adequately nourished mother (X) 25 3000 3025 
Not adequately nourished mother (~X) 12 1 13 
Totals 37 3001 3038 
 
We don’t now have many cases in the ~X~Y cell, but enough, we think, to check that ~X 
tends to imply ~Y
17
. By this test, and coverage, the necessary condition X remains non-trivial 
and relevant. However, in Schneider and Wagemann’s terms, both X and Y are nearly 
constants – the cases in this cell dominate - and, if we turn to their trivialness/relevance 
formula, then we get for the quasi-necessary “adequate nourishment” a low score of 0.342. 
Adequate nourishment, on their measure, is a trivial necessary condition. We can see that 
their formula is sensitive to the weights of the X and ~X rows, when nothing else, and 
certainly not the causal consequences of X and ~X, is changed. Table 10 summarises several 
measures for the two societies. 
Table 10: Various indices for societies D and E. 
Indices: Society D Society E 
Consistency with necessity of X 0.968 0.9997 
Coverage (re necessity) of X 0.992 0.992 
S-W relevance measure for X 0.981 0.342 
Consistency with sufficiency of X 0.992 0.992 
Consistency with sufficiency of ~X 0.077 0.077 
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 Since, comparing Table 8 and Table 9, the 12 in the ~X,~Y cell in Table 9 forms a smaller proportion of the 
total cases, we might perhaps argue that the problem of a potentially trivial necessary condition X is greater for 
this second population – in the sense that this cell is nearer the zero that would indicate trivialness for Goertz 
(2006).  
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There is a small difference in the necessity of X for Y, but on Ragin’s measure of importance 
(coverage, or the sufficiency of X for Y), the necessary condition is equally important in the 
two populations. The crucial difference is in the result from Schneider and Wagemann’s 
formula. What should we make of this? Can it help us, for example, advise a policy maker? 
Two possible views follow. 
1. A counterfactual thought experiment can be undertaken in which we shift the cases 
from the ~X row into the X row and then, assuming all else remains equal
18
, allocate 
the health outcomes to these new cases of X that the original cases of X have. The 
point of this is to simulate what would happen if we were able, ceteris paribus, to 
remove maternal malnourishment from the population. Doing this for Table 8, we 
produce a reduction in the number of unhealthy babies from 1225 to 36 (a 97.08% 
reduction). For Table 9, the corresponding result is a 32.14% reduction
19
, indicating a 
sense in which maternal nutrition is a less important factor in society E than D. This 
experiment suggests that the S-W formula can help us.  
2. There is, however, an alternative view. The results of the thought experiment required 
us to have two populations to compare. It is easy to imagine a situation in which we 
only have an analysis of one population. If this had happened to be the population in 
Table 9 – and this seems just as likely a scenario as that in Table 8 – then the S-W 
formula would have reported that X is a trivial, not relevant necessary condition. In 
spite of this, in this population, all else being equal, changing the nutritional status of 
the mothers in the ~X row would produce a substantial reduction in the numbers of 
unhealthy babies. Twelve
20
 of the twelve unhealthy babies in the row ~X would 
become healthy. The overall number of unhealthy babies would see a 32.14% 
reduction. In these senses, it isn’t a trivial condition.  
Both populations are possible scenarios. In each the generative causal structure is the same 
(i.e. X and ~X generate the same proportions of the two possible outcomes). Only the relative 
weights of X and ~X cases differ. The reason, of course, that in our first thought experiment 
we saw a greater reduction in unhealthy babies was simply because, while the generative 
causal structure remained the same, proportionally more of these appeared in the ~X row
21
.  
What conclusion might we draw from this section? One possible lesson might be that it is 
often worth introducing some policy-oriented thought experiments into the discussion of such 
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 This result is not sensitive to rescaling the tables so that they have the same total population. 
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 More precisely, 11.89.  
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 The coverage of ~X for ~Y is also much higher for society D than for society E: 0.980 versus 0.324. In 
Ragin’s terms ~X has more empirical importance for ill health in society D than E, even though the 
(probabilistic) causal consequences of ~X for any individual remain the same.                  
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matters as trivialness and relevance. Much discussion of these matters rightly focuses on the 
relative sizes of the sets X and Y, and related matters, and attempts to develop generally 
applicable formulae. But we know from other summarising measures that it is important to 
bear in mind the details of any particular case. The arithmetic average, for example, is a 
useful measure, as long as the distribution being summarised isn’t bimodal, doesn’t have 
many outliers, etc. In the same way as the latter features can cause problems for the 
interpretation of an average, we think that the weights of the rows of truth tables can cause 
problems when interpreting the meaning and implications of measures used in QCA.  We 
must be careful when employing formulaic approaches.  
 
5.2 Another approach 
 
With that advice in mind, we will indicate one way of thinking about the problem that can 
keep things clear in one’s mind when undertaking the analysis of truth tables.  To illustrate 
this, we will return to Table 7. The suggested approach involves regarding each row as 
evidence for the sufficiency or otherwise of the configuration it represents, while ignoring at 
this stage finer details concerning the degree of consistency with sufficiency (or necessity)
22
. 
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the evidence for each configuration in Table 7 is 
considered good enough to treat it as warrant for the eight claims in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Eight statements concerning sufficiency (idealised version of Table 7) 
Configurations with the outcome Y Configurations with the outcome ~Y 
  AB~C => Y 
~A~BC => Y 
  A~BC => Y 
  A~B~C => Y 
  ABC => ~Y 
~A~B~C => ~Y 
~AB~C => ~Y 
~ABC => ~Y 
 
Looking at the truth table in this way, we see that ~B is not strictly a necessary condition for 
Y, since AB~C=>Y. If we were to run a QCA on the temporary assumption that there is just 
one case per row, we would obtain a consistency with necessity for ~B for Y of 0.75, 
reflecting the fact it appears in three of the four rows to the left of Table 11. It can readily be 
seen, however, that, the higher the number of cases for the three lower rows to the left of 
Table 11 (~A~BC, A~BC, A~B~C) in relation to those for the row AB~C, the higher will be 
the reported consistency of necessity of ~B for Y, and the more serious the problem of this 
quasi-necessary condition being hidden in the solution for sufficiency will appear to be.  If 
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we allocate three cases each to the three lower rows on the left-hand side, leaving the row 
AB~C with just one, then consistency with necessity for ~B for Y is 0.90. If, however, we 
allocate 10 cases to AB~C, while leaving the lower three rows with just one case each, then 
the consistency with necessity for ~B for Y falls to 0.23.  
We can apply this same approach to the simple dataset from Society D and E. In both cases 
we can argue, let’s assume, that we have good enough evidence for the two (quasi-
sufficiency) claims: 
1. Adequately nourished mother => Healthy baby 
2. NOT (Adequately nourished mother) => NOT (healthy baby) 
The first of these is equivalent to the left-hand side of Table 11; the second to the right-hand 
side. If we were to pretend for a moment that these are both sufficient rather than (strong) 
quasi-sufficient claims, we could deduce from (2) the necessity of an “adequately nourished 
mother” for a healthy baby. This would enable us to say, having temporarily ignored the 
differing weights of X and ~X, that, for both societies D and  E, our X is sufficient and 
necessary for Y (or, more strictly, quasi- in both cases). From this perspective, the weights of 
the cases in the rows of D and E make no difference to this conclusion. We know, however, 
that when these sufficiency relations are expressed in a particular simulated social setting 
characterised by some particular number of cases in the X and ~X rows, the quasi-necessity 
of X is, in some sense, of a different sort in D to that in E, in so far as getting rid of 
malnourishment would remove a larger percentage of unhealthy babies in D than in E.  
 
5.3 A dilemma and a suggested response 
 
Where does this leave us? We have shown, by analysing several simulated datasets, that the 
weights of cases in the rows of a truth table will affect QCA results concerning the 
consistency with necessity and, in some situations, sufficiency of a factor.  
Should we worry about the fact that assessments of necessity, for example, vary as the 
weights of cases in rows of truth tables vary? We suspect that the position a scholar will take 
here will reflect their philosophical position. Someone of an empiricist frame of mind might 
want to argue that the assessment of necessity should accurately reflect just the observed 
patterns of data in whatever society is being studied. If the observed world, with our assumed 
causal structure in Section 2 (resulting in implications 1-4), looks like our dataset 2, and if we 
only enter S into our model, then S is quasi-sufficient and quasi-necessary for O, but if the 
world looks like our dataset 1 then it is only quasi-sufficient.  
22 
 
On the other hand, a realist (e.g. Bhaskar 1975, 1979, Pawson 1989) might argue that if we 
have adequate evidence from the study of the four types of case in datasets 1 and 2 in section 
2 such that we can complete the 1 case per row table shown here as Table 12, and, better 
still, also have an understanding of plausible causal mechanisms that suggests T is causally 
relevant and S not, then, irrespective of the weights of cases
23
 we can say that in both worlds 
observed via these datasets, T is sufficient and necessary for O, and S is not necessary for O. 
For the realist, we think, this would provide a single right answer.  
Table 12: Four statements concerning sufficiency (from section 2) 
Configurations with the outcome O Configurations with the outcome ~O 
  ST => O 
~ST => O 
  S~T => ~O 
~S~T => ~O 
 
As we saw in the previous section, we could also, in a similar way, argue for a single correct 
answer in the analysis of the societies D and E. However, this single answer doesn’t capture 
the important “empirical” difference we saw between these societies when we carried out the 
thought experiment of removing malnourishment in mothers. We suggest the following 
resolution of this dilemma. 
When analysing necessary conditions within a strictly causal perspective, it is informative to 
perform our one-case-per-row exercise. There seems to be a sense in which the answer this 
gives will be the right one, especially for a realist. If, in both societies D and E, there are 
causal processes that lead to (i) (nearly) all babies of malnourished mothers being unhealthy 
and (ii) (nearly) all babies of adequately nourished mothers being healthy, then it would seem 
right to privilege these two sufficiency claims (which parallel and actually arise from 
generative causal processes) - PLUS the implication of (i) that adequate maternal 
nourishment is also necessary for a baby’s health - over any formulaic results such as those 
deriving from the S-W relevance formula (which showed adequate nourishment to be a 
relevant necessary condition in one of these societies but not in the other).  
On the other hand, the S-W formula did capture an important difference of relevance to 
policy makers in the two societies. Similarly, Ragin’s coverage measure for necessity also 
captures something crucial for policy makers about the empirical importance of nourishment 
in both societies (that it is not only necessary but also sufficient for a healthy outcome). We 
therefore also suggest a second stage in which the nature of necessary conditions that have 
passed the test of the one-case-per-row exercise are explored by means of the various 
approaches developed by Ragin, Goertz and Schneider and Wagemann but also by means of 
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various thought experiments of the sort we have used here
24
. In addition, wherever possible, 
reference to plausible causal mechanisms is also likely to be helpful when judging what the 
necessity of a condition actually comprises.  
Ideally, of course, any scholar employing a Boolean approach will aim to establish a 
disjunction of configurations jointly sufficient and necessary for an outcome (Baumgartner, 
2014). To achieve this s/he will need, as well as eliminating redundant factors, to avoid 
omitting key explanatory factors from analytic models. In the latter ideal scenario, the issues 
we have raised become less important, though the assessment of the necessity of individual 
conditions will still vary with weights. Knowledge of plausible generative mechanisms, 
whether derived from theory or from within-case studies, will be useful in approaching this 
goal. However, most scholars will not achieve this degree of perfect explanatory knowledge 
and therefore need, we believe, to take account of the issues we have discussed.   
We have argued before (Cooper and Glaesser, 2011, Cooper et al. 2014) that there is more 
complexity in QCA than sometimes first meets the eye. Case weights add another layer of 
complexity to those we have previously discussed. Our view, confirmed by the exercise we 
have undertaken here, is that QCA users should always try to see beneath and around any 
formulaic approaches in the set theoretic field. We hope our discussion here, and any further 
work it encourages, will support such an approach.  
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